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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the debate on industry – university relations has been a crucial issue in regional, 
as well as in science & technology and industrial policy. Universities have become to be considered 
as key agents in the promotion of economic growth and in the transition to new knowledge-based 
economic activities both at the regional and national level. 
Policies of various kind have been implemented to favour closer links between academia and 
industry. In particular, emphasis has been attributed to the need of developing incentives and 
organisational structures for enhancing such links. In Europe, (and especially in Continental 
Europe), a doctrine – known as the “European Paradox” has become extremely influential, and it 
has also been made official through the publication by the European Commission in 1994 of the 
White Book on Innovation (CEC, 1994): that is to say, Europe produces research comparable to the 
American one, but it is unable to translate such research into successful technological innovation. 
Thus, an enormous variety of initiatives has been launched with the explicit aim to favour 
applied research as opposed to basic research, to strengthen the so-called “technology transfer”, to 
promote the so-called “entrepreneurial university”. These initiatives have typically involved the 
creation of science and technology parks, technology transfer offices, incubators, etc. - as well as, in 
some instances, a cut in public funds to academic research and above all their restructuring towards 
forms of contractual funding (Geuna, 2001).  Moreover, universities and individual academic 
researchers have been encouraged to seek industrial funding and to patent the results of their 
research activities. 
As known, the results of these efforts are mixed under every respect. Besides some success 
stories, in many other instances these experiences have not (yet?) delivered the expected outcomes. 
 In this paper, we begin to investigate the relevance of some possible factors influencing the 
intensity of university – industry relations, in the specific case of  Italy1. Specifically, we focus on 
(proxies of) industrial funding to academic research and try to identify some variables that make it 
more likely for academic institutions to attract funding from industrial sources.  Simple as the 
question and especially our exercise might be, we are not aware of many other studies taking the 
same perspective, at least as European countries are concerned.  
Our analysis is conducted at the level of the individual departments or institutes and it is based 
on a unique database provided by the Conference of the Rectors of the Italian Universities (CRUI) 
for the academic years 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95. This database, however, while providing 
invaluable – and otherwise unavailable -  information on Italian universities at a highly 
disaggregated level , constrains the choice of the specification of our equations to only a small 
subset of the potentially relevant variables.  Yet, once again we are not aware of systematic studies 
conducted at this level of disaggregation, the typical units of analysis usually take being either 
universities as a whole or individual researchers. 
Given all the limitations of this exercise, we still believe that the results can be useful both for 
the policy debate and for more theoretical issues. Indeed, the identification of  some of the 
determinants of industrial funding to universities could at least confirm or question the basis of the 
conventional wisdom in this area. Actually, our result show that the prevailing  doctrine and its 
policy implications are likely to be seriously flawed, both empirically and conceptually and that – if 
anything – university – industry relations are closely influenced by the quantity and quality of 
scientific academic research. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the scene, by briefly discussing the main 
features of the development of the debate on university-industry relations. Section 3 presents the 
database  and the econometric methodology used in this paper. Section 4 discusses the results. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The background  
2.1 Origins and motivations for stronger university-industry-ties 
  As it is well known, after World War II, and until the 1970s,  in Italy as in all European 
countries academic research was predominantly funded by  public sources. This attitude basically 
reflected the so-called  “Arrow-Nelson” model, according to which scientific research is essentially 
a public good and therefore worthy of government support also under criteria of economic 
efficiency. Moreover, interaction with industry was not perceived to be a fundamental mission of 
                                                          
1 See, for a more comprehensive discussion and analysis Bruno and Orsenigo (2002) 
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universities, which was thought to reside essentially in teaching and in free, pure research. In 
practice, university-industry interactions were certainly not uncommon,  especially in the fields of 
chemistry, in the medical  and in engineering schools and involved both rather simple and down-to-
earth activities like testing   of machinery, materials, etc., but also big science (the collaboration 
between Giulio Natta of the Milan Polytechnic and Montecatini for the discovery of polypropylene 
– which led to the Nobel prize- is the most frequently cited example). Moreover, consultancy was a 
rather widespread activity among university professors. Yet, most of these activities were largely 
informal and not systematically organized. Funding from private sources was not disencouraged, 
but regulated, especially in order to avoid excesses in the consultancy activities of faculty members 
at the expense of teaching and research.  
This situation began to be increasingly questioned since the  Seventies onwards. Various 
factors contributed to this changing attitude and it is not possible to discuss them in any detail. 
First, in all Europe the diffusion of mass academic education coupled with stricter budgetary 
constraints put the efficiency of the academic structures under severe pressures, not only financially 
but also in terms of the quality of teaching and research. At the same time, the industries that had 
traditionally been more active in linking with academic research – the typical example being 
chemicals – underwent a deep crisis, further contributing to the weakening of university-industry 
relations.  
Moreover, and especially in the face of the financial constraints, universities were 
increasingly asked to contribute more directly to technical innovation and economic growth. 
Coupled with the increasing recognition of the role that innovation has in generating economic 
growth, all this led to pressures for producing research which could be more valuable for industry 
and in general for establishing closer linkages with the business community. 
Finally, and perhaps even more importantly,  the upsurge of university-industry relations in 
the USA in the 1980s, the examples of the Silicon Valley and of the take-off of biotechnology – in 
general, the American science-based model of economic growth – provided a further and even more 
powerful argument for the promotion of a stronger involvement of universities in activities closer to 
the industrial world. The notion that universities could and should become key agents of economic 
growth at the national – and even more so – at the local level quickly became one of the leading 
policy recipes.  
These policies were largely based on a particular conceptualization of how the goal of closer 
university-ties could be achieved, i.e. on the notion of technology transfer and on the attempt at 
replicating the “American model” to the European scene. In a nutshell,  this model assumes that the 
key problem in establishing closer relation university-industry ties rests on the “distance” between 
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the academic and the industrial world and that appropriate incentives and organizational structures 
should be developed in order to bridge this gap.  
Different arguments – in some cases clearly inconsistent with each other -. have been used to 
justify this approach.  
First, it is claimed that universities are engaged too much in basic research as contrasted to more 
applied research, especially that supporting small and medium sized companies in “traditional 
industries”.   
Second, in another versions, the distance is essentially linked to the different orientations and 
value systems governing academic and industrial research. According to this view, scientists are 
essentially motivated by the rules of “open science” (Dasgupta and David, 1994) and therefore 
appropriate incentives should be introduced for scientists to engage in research relevant to industry: 
higher reliance on industrial rather than standard government funding, encouragement  to patent 
their research results, etc..  
Third, a further interpretation basically reverses the traditional view expressed in the Arrow-
Nelson model. Here, the main problem is identified in the observation that academic research is far 
from being a public good. Rather, it has a largely tacit nature and it has partly the property of 
“natural excludability”.  Moreover, it is claimed that the traditional “linear model” is fundamentally 
flawed, since it fails to recognize the intrinsically interactive nature of learning processes and it is 
recognized that the processes through which the knowledge created within universities impacts on 
industrial development and technological innovation are far more intricate than it is usually 
assumed in most (theoretical and empirical) models2.  As a consequence, the transfer of  knowledge 
requires close interaction with firms and intermediary institutions should be developed with the task 
of diffusing knowledge and making it accessible to a wide set of agents.   
Fourth, it is sometimes claimed that scientific research has become increasingly 
multidisciplinary and involves different types of institutions, techniques and methods (Gibbons et 
                                                          
2 The relevance of academic research and above all the mechanisms through which such knowledge is transmitted vary 
greatly across scientific disciplines, technologies and industries (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). Academic research 
contributes to the solution of technical problems of firms through a variety of channels, including the provision of 
instrumentation, of background knowledge (often industrial researchers are less interested in the content of publications 
than in the experience and tacit knowledge of the authors of those articles) and the participation in professional 
networks at the national and international level (Klevorick et al. 1995, Sequeira and Martin 1996, Pavitt 1996). 
Moreover, the effective acquisition of academic knowledge requires, on the firms’ side, at least three types of 
competencies: capabilities of absorbing the new knowledge created outside the industry (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), 
capabilities of exploring an expanding set of opportunities (through closed links with the scientific community) and 
capabilities to integrate different new and old scientific disciplines (Henderson, 1994). Finally, knowledge flows from 
university to industry are often local and geographically bounded (Jaffe 1989), mainly because knowledge is often 
embodied in individual scientists and research teams. The access to such knowledge requires the development of social 
ties and personal contacts, but also and mainly deep involvement in the research process and bench-level scientific 
collaboration. Finally, knowledge flows largely occur through the mobility of  people and teams across organizations 
and through the labour market (Zucker and Darby 1996, Lamoreaux and Solokoff, 1997. See for a provocative 
discussion of these issues  Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). 
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al, 1994). Thus, universities are no longer the privileged institutions in scientific research, but one 
agent in a dense and ever changing web of relations with other agents. Once again, the implication 
is that closer and flexible interaction with firms should be promoted and that appropriate institutions 
to facilitate these exchanges should be created. 
 However, this approach has proved to be only partially successful. Despite all the efforts, it 
is still widely perceived that university-industry ties remain underdeveloped in Europe and 
especially in Italy. Similarly, although the share of business firms in the funding of academic 
research has been actually increasing over the past ten years in Italy (in most European countries), 
its share remains small and government funding remains largely predominant (Geuna, 1999, Pavitt, 
2001). If anything, it is often observed that little change has taken place in the academic world, 
which continues to be dominated by bureaucratic, feudal and inertial structures. 
 
2.2  Alternative views 
Against this background, it becomes therefore legitimate and interesting to ask why has it 
has proved to be so difficult to “fill the gap” between industry and academia in Europe. Indeed, 
recently, several types of criticism have begun to be  advanced against the conventional  approach 
discussed so far. First, the appropriatedness of an excessive involvement of universities in industry-
oriented and commercial activities has been criticized on several grounds3. But even without 
entering into this discussion, other pieces of empirical evidence start to indicate that the 
development of university-industry relations might well be influenced by factors quite different 
from incentives and the development of organizational structures for the transfer of technology. 
 
2.2.1 The structure of Continental European Academic Systems 
 First, comparative history and sociology of academic systems offers interesting insights for 
an understanding of the difficulties that (mainly Continental European) universities face in linking 
with industry and suggests that far deeper changes might be needed in the structure and organisation 
of universities than bureaucratic simplification and the introduction of economic incentives.   
 First of all, it is often remarked that in Europe, university professors are public servants and 
their careers are fundamentally determined by bureaucratic and automatic rules, essentially based 
on seniority like in most others public jobs.  
                                                          
3 See for example Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998), as university patenting is concerned; David, Mowery and 
Steinmueller (1992) and David, Foray and Steinmueller (1999) about the dangers that the insertion of incentives 
mechanisms created by industrial funding might bear on the traditional orientation to Open Science, that are typical of 
academia; Geuna (1999) about the perverse effects that an increasing dependence of academic research on forms of 
“formula” and contractual funding – in general of quasi-market allocative principles - might have on the behaviour and 
efficiency of the academic system). 
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 Second, the organization of research and teaching in the USA has characteristics that 
facilitated both the production of high quality research and high degrees of mobility between 
academia and the commercial world (Ben-David 1976; Clarke 1984; Braun 1994). Specifically, in 
the USA (and in Great Britain) departments have long been the main organizational entities as 
opposed to the European institutes, dominated by a single professor, far less interdisciplinary in 
nature and with feudal-like career paths. As a consequence, for example, American universities 
have been and typically are particularly rapid and flexible in developing and building into their 
structure new scientific but especially new engineering disciplines that were formed to support new 
technologies when they arose (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998).  
 Moreover, in the USA high degrees of integration between  teaching and learning have been 
achieved through the sharp separation between undergraduate and post-graduate levels. The 
creation of research-oriented post-graduate studies entailed, in fact, a number of important 
consequences. In particular, post-graduate students are typically exposed and trained to the practice 
of scientific research within research teams composed by students and professors within 
departmental organizations. This arrangement does not only tend to free resources for scientific 
research, but provides also a fundamental experience in participating to and managing relatively 
complex organizations. In other words, it constitutes an essential source for the development of 
organizational capabilities. Moreover, the career of young research scientists after graduate studies 
has – under various perspectives -  entrepreneurial characteristics. For instance, post-docs have to 
raise funds for their own research in a highly competitive environment, where performance is 
judged on the basis of a track record and the ability to set an independent research agenda 
(Gittelman, 2000). Finally, graduate students joining the industrial world after the completion of 
their studies constitute an essential source of skilled demand for academic research.  
In Continental Europe, the integration of teaching with research has progressed far less than 
in the USA (and to some extent than in the UK). Clearly, enormous  differences in education 
systems, especially on the higher education level, exist across Continental European countries and 
they certainly should not be overlooked4.  Despite these enormous differences, however, the 
structure of the academic systems of many European countries shares some important common 
features, as compared to the Anglo-Saxon systems.  Ph.Ds are a relatively recent innovation in 
                                                          
4 For example, in France, universities have never been the main centre of both scientific research - which has 
been essentially conducted within the national laboratories and co-ordinated by the CNRS (National Center for 
Scientific Research) - and the education of the elites - monopolised by the system of the grandes écoles.  In Germany, 
the “institute” – dominated by an individual professor – has been the main organisational unit co-ordinating teaching 
and research. Moreover, an extremely efficient intermediate level of teaching applied disciplines like engineering has 
been developed (the “Fachhochschulen”), which integrates teaching and practice, but largely overlooks fundamental 
research.  
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many Continental European countries (in Italy they were introduced first in 1983) and they remain 
far less professionally orientated than in the U.S.A. Departmental structures are also relatively new 
and in many cases institutes continue to be a very important organisational entity. In general, 
research has tended to be far more removed from teaching than in the USA. And in fact, in many 
Continental European countries, research has been to a large extent separated from universities and 
concentrated in specialised institutions. It is possible to speculate that this separation might have 
had negative effects on both the quality of research and on the ability of academic institutions to 
interact with industry, mainly through the severing of the main channel through which knowledge 
flows take place, i.e. teaching.  Moreover, the separation between teaching and research and  the 
permanence of institutional academic structures that attribute an enormous power to the individual 
chair-holders might also have contributed to the persistence of promotion mechanisms that  favour 
much less scientific and teaching performance than the protection of influential “barons”. 
In this view, the development in Continental Europe of various types of specialised 
institutions for technology transfer, who act as intermediaries between research and industry, might 
be considered as an attempt at compensating this gap between teaching and research and of 
escaping from the feudal and bureaucratic academic rules. The presence of large scale intermediary 
institutions, however, might have paradoxically increased the distance between university and 
industry, introducing an additional layer in the relationship instead of favouring the required 
scientific, organisational and integrative capabilities directly within firms and within academic 
institutions. 
 
2.2.2 Quality of academic research 
A second possible explanation is to be found in the quantity and above all the quality of the 
research produced by universities. In this perspective, academic research influences industrial 
innovation mainly by opening up new opportunities of discovery and leads – rather than following – 
industrial demand. This interpretation seems to be at the basis of those interpretations of the 
American case that emphasize that the rise in university patenting – and more generally in the 
intensity of the relations between academia and the commercial world – is closely linked to the 
emergence and development of information technology and biotechnology (Mowery et al, 2001)  
and it pre-dates the introduction of incentives (mainly the Bayh-Dole Act) to university patenting. 
Supporting this view there is also evidence showing that innovative firms mostly use university 
research that is performed in high quality research universities, published in quality academic 
journals, funded publicly and cited frequently by academic themselves (Pavitt, 2001; Mansfield 
1995; Narin et al, 1997; Hicks et al., 2000). 
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 2.2.3  Industrial demand 
A third set of factors is related to the pre-existence of a strong demand for academic research 
expressed by industry. There are different ways through which “demand” can be interpreted. It can 
mean that firms are already engaged in systematic innovative activities and possess the “absorptive 
capacities” that are needed to get access and fruitfully make use of academic research. It may also 
be considered as a manifestation of the role that universities play in favour of local industry through 
consultancy, solution of technical problems, etc.. For example, Rosenberg and Nelson (1994) have 
pointed out that in the USA universities a have long tradition of interaction with local industries in 
response to practical concerns , particularly in practically oriented disciplines – like engineering, 
medicine, agricultural sciences, etc.. In sum, the existence of long standing relations and above all 
of a strong demand by industry – especially at the local level – might be a critical factor on which 
new ties can be developed. In this case, one would expect that local demand – as distinct from 
demand coming from other geographical areas - is particularly relevant. Put it another way, the 
“conventional” doctrine - by emphasizing incentives and the creation of markets and transfer 
structures for facilitating the exchange of knowledge between industry and academia – implicitly 
assumes that both the “supply” and the “demand” of knowledge are already present and that the 
problem resides mainly in the market or organizational failures that prevent a smooth and efficient 
exchange. However, in some instances – as it have often proved to be the case in local areas mainly 
populated by small firms active in “traditional industries” and substantially lacking technological 
capabilities -  it is mainly the weakness of local demand that prevents the establishment of stronger 
relations with local universities. Indeed, it is quite frequent to hear managers of local technology 
transfer offices complain that simply local firms are not interested in the research and services that 
universities are offering and that the marketing of such services should become the first priority in 
the activities of these centers. 
Clearly, all these groups and sub-groups of variables are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
On the contrary, it highly plausible that powerful dynamic relations exist among the, generating 
virtuous or vicious cycles. Thus, for instance, a strong industrial demand is likely to trigger actions 
by universities to build appropriate structure facilitating technology “transfer”. Similarly, the 
quality of research might benefit from strong industrial funding, insofar as the latter provides 
financial resources for further support to research, increases the chance of having access to 
additional public funding, etc. (see Geuna 1999, for a discussion of some of these issues). 
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3. The empirical analysis: sources, data and methodology 
Our econometric analysis is just a first attempt at exploring quantitatively industry-
university relations. In fact, it focuses on just one aspect of  these relations, namely industrial 
funding to academic research. Second, our analysis is severely constrained by the availability of 
data. Similarly, we are unable to examine in depth the dynamic interrelations between the relevant 
variables. In this perspective, our analysis is to be understood mainly as a preliminary descriptive 
exercise, aiming at establishing some major correlations among the variables, rather than a 
complete investigation of the complex causal relations among them, let alone a test of alternative 
theories. 
Within this broad framework, we basically ask the following questions: 
First,  how is industrial funding to academic research influenced by the main categories of 
variables discussed in the preceding section? In particular, we try to assess the role played 
respectively by:  
i) the quality and quantity of research - as an indicator of new innovative opportunities 
generated by universities that can possibly be picked up by industry.  
ii) The existence of a local industry that expresses a demand for the research services 
and/or the more applied research that universities can provide to local firms.  
iii) Other organizational characteristics of departments and universities, like size, 
prestige, age, etc; existence of dedicated organizational structures  
A second related question refers to the relationships between teaching and the 
ability/willingness to interact with industry. Is there complementarity or substitution between 
teaching, research and the intensity of the linkages with industry? Does teaching – especially at the 
undergraduate level – absorb resources that might be used for research and support to firms? Or is  
this interaction linked and complementary to the teaching of skills and techniques to students?  
Third, what are the similarities and the differences between the revealed allocative principles 
governing public and industrial funding to academic research? 
 
3.1 The Data 
The data are provided by the Conference of Italian University Rectors (CRUI), on the basis of a 
questionnaire submitted for the academic years 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95  to all Italian 
universities.  
The questions were answered by offices partly at the level of universities, partly at the level of 
individual Faculties and partly at the level of individual departments. As a result, the database 
contains information on several characteristics of Italian universities, although at different levels of 
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aggregation. Globally, the dataset provides 4893 observations: 1218 in 1992-93; 1348 in 1993-94; 
2327 in 1994-95  
The rate and the accuracy of the responses varies greatly across respondents and over time. 
In some years, for example, entire universities did not answer, while providing very detailed 
information in another year. Similarly, there are serious doubts about the accuracy of the answers, 
especially as it concerns scientific production and funding. After 1995, CRUI discontinued the 
survey in its parts concerning disaggregated research output and funding and therefore more recent 
data concern only teaching activities and other administrative information5. 
Despite all these problems, the database is unique because it is the only available source that 
provides such detailed and disaggregated data. In particular, it is the only dataset that allows us to 
link data about scientific output (in terms of number of books, articles published in Italy and at the 
international level, conferences organized, etc.) and data concerning amounts and sources of 
funding to research at the level of individual departments. 
It is worth noting that most of the literature dealing with I-U relations has not focused 
directly on the determinants of industrial funding, especially in Europe and even more so at the 
level of departments. Research  has concentrated on the one hand on the determinants of research 
productivity of universities and individual scientists ; on the outcomes of industrial funding on the 
other, e.g. on the trend in patenting, on the rate of new firms formation, on (local) economic growth, 
etc.. Some evidence from the USA and the UK tends to show that industrial – but also public – 
funding tends to be highly concentrated in a small group of prestigious research universities 
(Mansfield, 1995), although in recent years a significant growth is observed in recent years of some 
smaller and less prestigious universities. In particular, it has been shown that the growth of 
university patenting following Bayh-Dole in the USA derives almost entirely on the increased 
activities of new, smaller and less prestigious institutions (Mowery et al. 2001).  
 
3.2 Descriptive evidence 
Let us begin by examining some basic descriptive evidence. 
                                                          
5 In the past few years, Italian universities have shown a remarkable dynamism in their attempts to link with 
industry and – more generally – to simplify bureaucratic regulations. To a large extent, this ferment is linked to the 
process of reforming Italian universities, mainly by conceding them autonomy from the central government, both 
financially and in terms of freedom of launching new degrees, internal regulations, etc.. Similarly, the criteria governing 
public funding have started to change. In particular, as it concerns  research, stricter criteria have been introduced that – 
in principle – should favour scientific excellence (e.g. external refereeing of grants applications, ex-post peer evaluation 
of the scientific output, etc..) and tend to increase the role of contractual funding as compared to general funding. The 
effects of these initiatives is yet to be determined. Certainly, the time span considered in our data does not allow us to 
consider these changes, let alone to evaluate them. Thus, it is possible that the following analysis cannot  be used 
straightforwardly to interpret the current situation of Italian academia.  
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 Table 1 shows the share of private sources of funding to research by scientific discipline.  
The database distinguishes two main sources: “private funding” and “research contracts”. The 
former variable includes all sorts of funding that goes to academic research by private institutions 
(e.g. donations, general support to research projects, etc..). The latter variable includes funding 
coming by any kind of contractor for specific research contracts. Thus, these variables do not 
correspond strictly to industrial funding, which is only a subset of these funds. Yet, they give a 
broad indication of the funding that goes to academic research outside the conventional public 
sources. 
// TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE // 
 
The share of “industrial”  funding is higher than it is usually assumed. The share of – 
respectively - research contracts and private funding on total funding to research is around 15% and 
8% . Considering that only a fraction of this funding comes from industry proper, these figures are 
broadly consistent with OECD data that indicate in around 5 to 6% the industrial contribution to 
academic research in the late Nineties. However, these sums are ridiculously low in absolute terms 
(Table 2). Even in the most “industrial-intensive” discipline – industrial engineering – the average 
per head (sum of private funding plus contract research/number of researchers) is less than Euros 
5.000 per year. This indicates – of course – that also public funding is very low in absolute terms. 
 
// TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE // 
 
Industrial funding is not surprisingly concentrated in few scientific disciplines: engineering, 
followed by medicine, agriculture and chemicals. The share of biology – if anything – is much 
lower than one might expect, given that biomedical research is perhaps the most dynamic scientific 
discipline in linking with industry all over the world.  
The distribution of funding by university is not surprisingly highly concentrated in the largest, 
most prestigious universities, but public funding is  less concentrated than industrial funding (Table 
3). The first 6 universities get almost 50% of total revenues from research contracts (and Milan 
Polytechnic alone gets around 9%) but one third of total public funding. Moreover, the ranking is 
not the same. Milan Polytechnic does not appear among the largest fifteen recipients of public funds 
and other smaller universities figure prominently in the list.  
 
// TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE // 
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Similar results are obtained at the level of departments. The distribution of funding by 
department – especially industrial funding, but also public funding - is highly skewed (Figure 1), 
but much less concentrated. The Concentration Index, C4, ranges between 3% (public funding) and 
6% (industrial funding) and the ranking of the recipients is highly unstable and variable over time. 
However, departments belonging to the Polytechnics of Milan  frequently appear in the list of the 
biggest recipients of industrial funding (5 in the first twenty departments), whereas the ranking for 
public funds is much more variable and distributed among departments that do not necessarily 
belong to the largest universities. Interestingly, physics and chemistry departments appear 
consistently in the top positions of public funding, whereas engineering and medicine departments 
take the lion’s share in industrial funds. 
 
// INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE // 
 
Also the distribution of publications, domestic and above all, international is not surprisingly also 
highly skewed. 
 Despite this variability, data not reported here (see Bruno and Orsenigo, 2002, for an 
analysis of the transition probability matrices for industrial and public funding and for international 
and Italian publications)  show a remarkable persistence is observed in the ability of departments to 
get funding.  
In sum, the emerging picture suggests that university- industry links involve typically small 
contracts, that are widely distributed and highly variable over time and across departments, 
although the largest and more prestigious universities emerge as the biggest recipients of industrial 
and (less so) public funds. Moreover, the ability to get funding appears to be cumulative, at least in 
the sense that recipients of research funding are likely to continue to do so. “Barriers to entry” exist 
but they do not look insurmountable, but they are stronger for industrial funds. 
 
3.3 Econometric Analysis 
The unit of analysis of our exercise is the individual department or institute. In principle, one 
should focus on research teams as the ideal unit of investigation. However, data at this level of 
disaggregation are unavailable and the department/institute is the closest level one can get. Not all 
observations refer to departments, though. Some of them refer to Faculties within a specific 
university. While this is essentially dictated by sheer availability of data, it is also worth noting that 
prestigious universities may generate spillovers for individual departments and some of the 
organizational capabilities and infrastructures are organized at the university level (even though 
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qualitative evidence shows that very often these functions have been either informal or delegated to 
individual departments).  
We develop our econometric analysis in different steps. First,  we  pool all observations; 
then we concentrate only on the more “industry – intensive” disciplines in two ways. In one set of 
regressions  we simply eliminate the disciplines that get less industrial funding – mathematics, 
social sciences and humanities. In another set of regressions we focus only the engineering and the 
biomedical departments, who capture the bulk of the funding. Fourth, we identify a subset of 
“excellent” departments and universities – those having the highest levels of industrial funding, 
irrespective of the discipline. Finally, we develop a two stage estimation procedure, in order to start 
coping with problems of dynamic endogeneity between some endogenous and exogenous variables. 
Given missing data and censoring problems inherent in the dataset, we use Random effect 
Tobit regressions and  Standard Tobit for the regressions on the individual scientific fields. 
 
3.4 The specification  
In general terms, our specification tries to capture – in a highly stylized way – the influence 
that the different categories of variable discussed previously – “supply” and “demand variables, 
organizational and department/university- specific variables – might have on the flow of industrial 
funding to academic research. Moreover, we estimate also the effects that the same variables have 
on the flows of public funding, in order to compare the different  “revealed allocative principles” 
that guide industrial and public funding. 
The dataset however imposes severe limitations on the availability of measures and proxies 
of the potentially relevant variables. In particular, we have no variables capturing incentives (which 
however do not change over time and across universities) and structures for technology transfer. 
Thus, we cannot directly test for the role played by these institutions in promoting university-
industry ties. 
 
Dependent variables 
 The endogenous variables used in the following regressions are: 
a) as far as it concerns “industrial funding”, we concentrate attention on the absolute amount of 
funds accruing to individual departments that derive by research contracts (RESCON).  This is by 
far the most relevant and the easier to interpret measure at our disposal. “Private funding” is not 
only much smaller in absolute terms, but it is a much more heterogeneous – and sometimes difficult 
to interpret measure. The database provides also another measure, namely the number of 
agreements and “framework contracts” between universities and other institutions. However, this 
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variable does not specify the amount of funds involved and it is again a  highly heterogeneous 
category6. 
b) as for public funding, we distinguish instead between two major sources: the so-called “40% 
Funds (40%) and the “60% Funds” (60%). Both categories are erogated by the Ministry of 
University and Scientific Research. However, the procedures governing their distribution are quite 
different.  
60% Funds are in essence a non-targeted form of research funding. They are by and large 
distributed to each individual university basically as a function of  the number of professors. Then 
each university re-allocates these funds to individual professors according to their own procedures. 
In practice, these funds are a form of general funding, where each professor gets a (usually quite 
small)  amount of money for “subsistence”, equal for everybody. Often – but not always - 
universities allocate these funds on a hierarchical principle: full professors get more than associate 
professors and the latter more than assistant professors. However, within each rank, each gets the 
same amount. These funds are typically used to pay for some travelling costs, purchase of books 
and software and the like.  
40% Funds are instead “targeted” funds, distributed according to a competitive evaluation of 
research proposals presented by the various research teams – typically collaborations between 
different teams of different universities - to a national commission. Thus, in principle, these funds 
should be allocated on the basis of standard academic criteria like the scientific value of the project, 
the curricula of the participants, etc.. Quite obviously – and especially on the Italian scene – issues 
of academic power interfere in the process and criticism has been raised in several occasions that 
also this category of funding is excessively spread so to give something to everybody and too 
influenced by academic politics7. Yet, there is no question that these funds are allocated according 
to more “scientific-based” criteria than the previous ones. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
a) Scientific production: 
A first group of variables is meant to capture the “opportunity” effects for industrial 
innovation generated by academic research. That is to say, firms would fund academic research as 
long as the latter creates “discoveries” – and more generally advancements in the understanding of 
particular phenomena -  that contribute to firms’ innovative activities. As mentioned previously, 
                                                          
6 It might be worth noting, however, that regressions on this endogenous variable give essentially the same results 
obtained with the variable “contract research”. 
7 Recently, the evaluation procedure has been changed, introducing co-funding and external, anonymous referees, both 
Italian and international experts.   
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earlier literature (Klevorick et al, 1995, for instance) has shown that in most cases firms do not 
usually rely on very recent scientific results. However, in some industries and scientific fields – like 
biomedical research and information technologies – state-of-the-art scientific knowledge is 
fundamentally relevant for industrial innovation. Typically, these industries are precisely those 
where linkages with academia are stronger. In a broader sense, firms might fund academic research 
in specific departments not necessarily because they produce “radical” discoveries, but simply 
because – or provided that - they produce high quality research. Put it another way, firms would 
have little interest in funding uninteresting academic research. In this sense, we would expect 
industrial funding to academic research to be positively correlated to the quality and the amount  of 
research produced in – and to the scientific productivity of - any given department. 
The CRUI database provides different possible proxies for the quality of research, each with 
its own limitations and drawbacks. We have chosen two main variables: the number of  
international publications (articles) (INTPUB) and the number of articles published in Italian 
(ITAPUB). The number of international articles is expected to reflect higher scientific quality as 
compared to domestic publications. As known, the sheer number of published articles is a very poor 
proxy of scientific excellence, since it does not consider the quality and reputation of the journals, 
the impact of the paper and so forth. Yet, absent any further information, scientific output measured 
this way remains the only and less unsatisfactory proxy of the quality of research8.  In order to take 
into account the different rates of publications that typical to each scientific discipline, we actually 
use the difference between the actual number of publications and the median number of  
publications in that scientific discipline (although results change only marginally). 
   
 
b) “Demand” variables
The second group of variables tries to capture what we defined as “demand effects”. That is 
to say,  university-industry interactions should be enhanced by the presence of a strong industrial 
base that generates demand for the research,  services and contribution to the solution of specific 
problems that universities can perform for them. Absent such demand, academic research is much 
less likely to have an impact on industrial activities. Differently from the “opportunity” variables, 
the demand variables have a much stronger “local” and geographically-bounded nature. Not 
                                                          
8 The CRUI database gives also information on the number of published books (Italian and international), the number of 
organized conferences and seminars and the presentations at national and international conferences. In some sets of 
regressions, we used also measures of the departments’ scientific productivity  by dividing the number of publication by 
the number of professors (full, associate and assistant professors) affiliated to the department itself. Results do not 
change. 
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necessarily firms in a given location look for the best research available, but turn to local 
universities for help in less sophisticated activities.  
We use three variables to measure these effects. First, we use an indicator of specialization  
in manufacturing in the province where the department is located (MANEMP), defined as the 
number of employees in manufacturing. This variable should capture the role that the existence of a 
strong industrial base might have in generating interaction with universities. We use also the 
number of patent applications at the European Patent Office in the province (PAT), in order to 
distinguish – in principle – the role played by the demand of respectively innovative firms as 
distinct from a more generic industrial demand. Finally, we also use the total population of the 
province (POPPROV). This variable might capture the demand coming not from manufacturing 
firms as such, but by other companies active in different sectors, e.g. services. Moreover, it might 
well be that university-industry ties tend simply to concentrate in large metropolitan areas, where 
big (and probably also more prestigious) universities  are located and that attract firms from other 
locations. We also include interaction terms between the specialization and patent variables on the 
one hand and the province population on the other.  In particular, we include both the ratio between 
patents and employees in manufacturing over the province population (PATRES and 
MANEMPRES); and the product of the same variables( PATRES2 AND MANEMP2). The reason 
of this specification is to control for potentially different effects that innovative intensity and 
specialization in manufacturing may have on industrial (and public funding) according to the size of 
the province.  
 
c) Department- and university-specific variables 
A third group of variables includes different measures of department and university-specific 
variables.  
A first sub-group refers to the role of teaching. As discussed previously, it is a widespread 
opinion that a heavy teaching load might have detrimental effects on both research and interaction 
with industry. On the other hand, a high number of students is a proxy for the department size and 
large departments, with many students and many dissertations, may more easily attract industrial 
funding. Thus, we use the number of students (STUD) as an exogenous variable in our regressions. 
These variables do not pertain to the individual department though, but to the Faculty to which the 
department is affiliated. Moreover, a distinction between undergraduate and postgraduate studies 
might be relevant here. Indeed, an emphasis on postgraduate training may benefit interaction with 
industry both indirectly – through the positive effects on the research of the department – and 
directly – Ph.D.students find a job in industry and therefore induce a “taste for research” in the firm 
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and constitute anyhow a source of absorptive capabilities within firms. Thus, in some regressions, 
we use also the number of Ph.D students (Ph.D) as a dependent variable. However, only few 
departments indicate the number of their postgraduate students and thus the number of observations 
is drastically reduced.  
A second subgroup of variables basically controls directly for the size of the department. 
The variables used in the regressions are the number of professors (full, associate and assistant 
professors) affiliated to the department (PROF) and  the number of technical and administrative 
employees of the department (ADTECH). This variable might be also loosely interpreted as a proxy 
for some organizational capabilities of the department. A high number of technical and 
administrative employees might indicate that the department is not simply big, but also well staffed 
and organized, both as the function of laboratories and administrative offices is concerned. 
Moreover, intensive relations with industry are likely to require (and also to create the resources 
for) a larger number of technicians and administrative people. However, this interpretation is far 
from being clear. A big number of non-teaching employees might simply reflect the academic 
power of the local baron or – even worse – sheer inefficiency in the use of resources. Thus, this 
variable is best interpreted as a control for size.   
Finally, we include the year of foundation of the department (AGE).  
Available data – either coming from the CRUI database or from other sources - do not allow 
us to develop measures for what we called “organizational variables”, including both the incentives 
to engage in relations with industry and the “bridging” facilities for technology transfer. This is a 
major weakness of this exercise. However, as incentives are concerned, the rules and regulations 
governing them were invariant at the time across departments and universities, since they are set at 
the national level, and they did not change significantly over time. The absence of measures of 
“transfer capabilities” is more serious. It implies that we cannot test directly the relative importance 
of the various possible factors affecting university-industry ties, but only evaluate the role played 
the variables that have received less attention in the debate, i.e. scientific capabilities on the one 
hand  and  “demand” conditions on the other.  
 
Dummy variables 
Finally, our regressions include different sets of dummy variables.  
First, we include dummies for the 57 universities to which departments are affiliated, in order to 
control for possible “spillovers” or university-specific-effects that may affect individual 
departments. 
In sum, the “general regression” has the following form (dropping subscripts for simplicity): 
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 Yj = a + b1 INTERPUB + b2 ITAPUB + b3 PAT + b4 MANEMP + b5 PATRES +  b6 MANEMPRES 
+ b7 PATRES2 +  b8 MANEMPRES2 + b9 POPPROV + b10 STUD +  b11 PROF + b12 ADTECH + 
b13 AGE + DUMMIES UNIVERSITY  
 
with  j = 1, 2, 3 and Y1 = RESCON, Y2 = 60%, Y3 = 40%, 
 
4. The Results 
4.1 The General Regressions 
Results for the general regressions are reported in Table 5. The variable measuring the year of 
foundation of the department is never significant and it has then been omitted. 
// TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE // 
In the equation for industrial funding (contract research, CONRES), the coefficients of the 
variables measuring international scientific production (INTERPUB), number of professors and 
administrative and technical employees (PROF and ADTECH)  are positive and significant. The 
number of students (STUD) has a negative and significant coefficient. Domestic scientific 
production is non significant. The effects of the demand variables are quite complex. The number of 
patents (PAT) has a negative and significant coefficient. However, both the interaction terms with 
the province population  (PATRES and PATRES2) have a positive and significant sign. 
Conversely, the  number of employees in manufacturing (MANEMP), the product interaction term 
(MANEMPRES2) and the province population coefficients are non significant, while the degree of 
specialization in manufacturing is positive and significant at the 10% level.  
In sum, these results suggest that industrial funding tends to be positively linked to the ability of 
producing scientific research at the international level, to the size of the department in terms of 
teaching and non teaching staff, while the teaching load seems to have a negative effect. Funding 
goes to big, scientifically productive, well organized universities, irrespective of the size of the 
province. The effects of local innovative activities (as measured by patents) have something like a 
U shaped form in relation to the province population. They are positive in small, highly patent 
intensive areas and in the large, highly patent intensive provinces. The effect of the number of 
patents as such on the ability of departments to attract industrial research funding are however 
negative. A high degree of specialization in manufacturing activities enhances industrial funding. 
Let us look now at the regressions for public funding. The results for the equation for 60% 
funds are largely to those for research contracts. The main differences are that here publications in 
Italian are significant with a negative sign and the variables measuring industrialization have an 
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opposite behaviour as compared to industrial research contracts: specialization in manufacturing 
(MANEMPRES) and the product interaction term (MANEMPRES2) have a negative sign, but the 
number of employees in manufacturing (MANEMP) is positive. Moreover, the size of the province 
(POPPROV) is significant and positive.  
As 40% funds are concerned, the results confirm the significant and positive coefficients of the 
variables measuring international scientific production (INTERPUB), number of professors and 
administrative and technical employees (PROF and ADTECH). Again, the number of students 
(STUD) has a negative and significant coefficient and domestic scientific production (ITAPUB) is 
non significant. Here, however, the effects of variables measuring local innovativeness are opposite 
as compared to the case of industrial funding. The number of patents (PAT) has a positive 
coefficient while both the interaction terms with the province population  (PATRES and PATRES2) 
have a negative sign. Moreover, none of the variables measuring the strength of the local industrial 
base are significant.  
 In other words, there are remarkable similarities between the revealed allocative 
mechanisms governing industrial and public funding, but also important differences. Large, 
scientifically productive and well organized universities tend to attract higher levels of both 
industrial and public funding. However, public sources of research funds are more concentrated in 
large metropolitan areas  and, above all, are less and differently  influenced by the “demand” 
variables.  
 
 4.2 Regressions for specific scientific disciplines 
The general regressions discussed above consider departments active in all scientific disciplines, 
including those having very little interaction with industry. In order to focus attention only on those 
scientific disciplines where most of the action takes place, we ran two more series of regressions9. 
In the first series, we excluded mathematics, social sciences and humanities. Results of these 
regressions – not reported here – confirm the previous ones, although in general the level of 
significance of the coefficients is lower – probably as a consequence of the lower number of 
observations. 
In the second series of regressions we considered only the most “industry-intensive” 
disciplines, namely biomedical sciences and engineering.  Results are reported in Table 6. 
// TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE // 
As industrial research contracts are concerned, the positive and significant role of 
international publications (INTERPUB), teaching and non-teaching employees (PROF and 
                                                          
9We also ran regressions for each of the 14 scientific fields identified in the dataset, to check for systematic differences 
across disciplines. However, we obtain too often non-significant results as a consequence of  lack of observations. 
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ADTECH) are confirmed. Yet, here the number of students has a positive sign. Moreover, 
differently from the general equation, neither the patent variables, the industrialization variables and 
the size of the province are  significant. 
 Thus, industrial research contracts in these scientific disciplines appear to accrue mainly to 
scientifically productive and large departments – also in terms of students - irrespective of their 
location.  
Public funding exhibits a somewhat different behaviour. International publications 
(INTERPUB), the number of professors (PROF) and of students (STUD)  have again significant 
and positive coefficients, but  now the variable for administrative and technical employees 
(ADTECH) is non significant. Moreover, interesting differences can be observed as it concerns the 
“demand” variables. In the equation for 60% funds, the number of patents (PAT) is negative and the 
two interaction terms (PATRES and PATRES2) are positive: i.e., the effects of local innovation has 
a U-shaped form in relation to the size of the province. Conversely,  the number of employees in 
manufacturing (MANEMP) is positive but the two interaction terms (MANEMPRES and 
MANEMPRES2) are negative: the effect of a high number of employees in manufacturing 
decreases in the smaller and larger provinces. Finally, the size of the province (POPPROV) is 
positive. 
 In the case of 40% funds, patents (PAT) are significant at the 5% level and positive but the 
interaction terms are non significant. The measures of specialization in manufacturing are non 
significant, except for the share of employees on total population (MANEMPRES), which has a 
positive sign and is significant at the 5% level. Again, as in the case of 60% funds, the size of the 
province (POPPROV) is positive. 
 Thus, public funds tend to go large and scientifically productive  universities, although the 
technical and administrative personnel does not matter as in the case of industrial funds. Moreover, 
again the “demand” variables have a different impact as compared to industrial funds. Finally, 
public funds accrue to departments located in large provinces. 
 
4.3 Two stages estimation procedure 
Many of the dependent and independent variables in our regressions are likely to be actually 
endogenously co-determined and influenced by their past values. For example, it might very well be 
that scientific production is influenced by past funding. In order to start addressing the problem of 
simultaneous co-determination between the variables, we have developed a two-stage procedure, 
that focuses on international and Italian publications as determinants of public and industrial 
funding.  
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In the first step, we construct  dummy variables for respectively international and domestic 
publications, DINTERPUB and DITAPUB. They take a value = 1, if there is at least one 
publication, 0 otherwise. Then, we apply a logit model, where Pr { DINTERPUB, DITAPUB  = 1} 
is a function of the following lagged variables: international publications, nr. of professors, non 
teaching employees, students. Moreover, we include the current values of the other variables 
employed in the previous regressions: patents, patents per capita in the province, the interaction 
between the number of patents and the province population, employees in manufacturing in the 
province, employees in manufacturing in the province divided by province population, employees 
in manufacturing in the province times province population, province population. Finally, we 
include as an additional instrument the number of Ph.D students (Ph.D). On the basis of the result 
of these regressions, we compute the probability of producing at least one international and Italian 
publications for each department. 
 In the second stage (Random effects Tobit model), we regress the amount of “industrial 
funding” (RESCON) on these probabilities of producing at least one international or Italian 
publication obtained in the first step plus the same remaining variables included in the “standard”  
specification used in the previous regressions.  
In sum, we try to correct for the occurrence of a simultaneity bias between research and 
funding. 
 Table 7 reports the results for the first step, respectively for all departments and only for 
biomedical and engineering departments. In the general regression for international publications, 
the lagged values past international publications, number of professors (at the 10% level) 
administrative and technical employees have a significant and positive coefficient. Moreover, the 
second interaction term for  patents times province population (PATRES2) is also positive and 
significant at the 5% level., while  the degree of specialization in manufacturing (MANEMPRES) 
and province population are negative and significant. Finally – and interestingly – the number of 
PH.D students is positive and significant. Similar results are obtained for Italian publications. 
However, the number of professors is no longer significant, while the number of students becomes 
positive and significant at the 10% level. The behaviour of the patent and of the industrialization 
variables is also different. The total number of patents is negative and the ratio of patents to 
province population is positive; the number of employees in manufacturing is positive, but the share 
of manufacturing employees on total population as well as total province population are negative. 
// TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE // 
In the regressions that consider only engineering and biomedical scientific disciplines, only 
past publications and the number of Ph.D students are significant with a positive sign. In the case of 
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Italian publications, also the coefficient on the number of professors is negative and significant, but 
only at the 10% level. 
 The main interest of these regressions lies in  predicting the probabilities of publishing, 
conditional on instruments validity. And this seems to be  the case indeed, especially as lagged 
publications and Ph.D students are concerned. 
 On these grounds, we can turn to the second step (Table 8). Results are quite similar for the 
general regression and the regression for engineering and biomedical sciences. International 
publications and  the number of students are strongly significant with a positive sign. The number 
of professors is positive only in engineering and biomedical departments, while it is negative but 
barely significant in the general regression.  The patent variables have the already observed U-
shaped impact: they are positive in small, highly patent intensive areas and in the large, highly 
patent intensive provinces. Conversely, the degree of industrialization  has an inverted U-shaped 
impact: a high number of employees in manufacturing has a s positive effect on the ability to get 
industrial funding, but this effect decreases in larger and smaller “manufacturing- intensive” 
provinces. The size of the province itself is non significant. 
// TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE // 
In sum, these results broadly confirm and make our previous findings more precise. 
Industrial funding is attracted by departments that are large in terms of students and prolific in terms 
of international publications. The demand variables are important but have an opposite behaviour. 
Local innovative activities are important in the smallest and largest provinces. The presence of a 
strong manufacturing sector is less and less important in the smaller and larger areas. 
  
5. Conclusion 
In general, industrial funding goes to big, scientifically productive, well organized universities, 
in areas specialized in manufacturing, but irrespective of the size of the province. The effects of 
local innovative activities are positive in small, highly patent intensive areas and in the large, highly 
patent intensive provinces. However, by concentrating in the more “industry-intensive” scientific 
disciplines (engineering and biomedical research), some important differences emerge. The number 
of students has now a positive role and the demand variables play no role. These results are largely 
confirmed in the two-stage estimating procedure, the only differences being i ) the role played by 
the industrialization variables  - positive but decreasing in the smaller and larger areas and ii) the 
similarities observed here between the general regression and the regression for engineering and 
biomedical sciences. 
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There are remarkable similarities between the revealed allocative mechanisms governing 
industrial and public funding, but also important differences. Large, scientifically productive and 
well organized universities tend to attract higher levels of both industrial and public funding. 
However, public sources of research funds are more concentrated in large metropolitan areas  and, 
above all, are less and differently  influenced by the “demand” variables. In the case of engineering 
and biomedical research, moreover, the technical and administrative personnel does not matter as in 
the case of industrial funds.  
In essence, these results tell that the main determinants of both industrial and public funding are 
to be found in the size, organization and especially scientific performance of universities. In 
particular, the positive and significant effect of the  number of international publication on both 
public and industrial funding is an extremely robust result, under different specifications, samples 
considered and estimation techniques. On the other hand,  demand variables matter in the allocation 
of public funds, but much less in the case of industrial funding. Presumably, “excellent” universities 
develop ties and interactions with industry that spans beyond the local boundaries, especially in the 
case of the most industry-intensive disciplines. 
 These findings largely confirm results and perceptions obtained for other European countries 
and the USA. That is to say, university-industry interactions tend to be concentrated in few, large 
and prestigious universities and departments. While this observation does not obviously imply – by 
any means – that universities don not play any significant economic role at the local level, it 
suggests that the “conventional” understanding of and policy stance towards university-industry 
relations is likely to be seriously flawed. Put it bluntly, (the various versions of ) the “European 
Paradox” doctrine appear to miss a fundamental issue, namely that very little interaction can 
develop absent excellent scientific performance. On the contrary, the ability to produce good 
research is the pre-condition for the development of a strong role of universities towards industry. 
In other words, rather than – or before - promoting the development of various kinds of incentives 
for a stronger involvement of academia in the industrial world and “technology transfer” 
institutions, policies should be directed towards the strengthening of the traditional mission of 
universities, the production of state-of-the-art scientific research.  
 This observation is partially strengthened by the results obtained for the variable number of 
students. While the impact of the teaching load is negative on both industrial and public funding in 
the general regression, it turns actually positive in the equations considering only biomedical 
research and engineering and in the two stage procedure. Moreover, it is worthwhile reminding the 
positive effect of the number of Ph.D students in the first stage of the two step procedure, i.e. as an 
explanatory variable of scientific output. This might suggest that – at least in engineering and 
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biomedical departments – teaching is an important channel around which collaboration with 
industry is built and developed, while an emphasis on post-graduate teaching is complementary to 
good scientific research within the departments.  
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Table 1: Private funding to academic research and revenues from research contracts as a % of total funding for 
academic research by scientific discipline. Academic year 1994-95 
 
Private funding Research contracts 
Mathematics 1.03 2.02 
Physics 1.24 4.44 
Chemistry 3.2 9.47 
Geology and environmental sciences 3.04 8.45 
Biology and biomedical sciences 4.93 6.69 
 Medicine 7.39 14.47 
Agriculture 2.45 12.68 
Civil engineering and architecture 2.23 14.87 
Industrial Engineering 6.95 17.82 
Information  Technologies 3.22 10.38 
Arts and Literature  3.55 2.92 
History and Philosophy 0.99 2.87 
Law, political and social sciences 0.37 2.59 
Economics and  statistics 5.56 5.28 
Source: CRUI 
 
 
Table 2: Private funding to academic research and revenues from research   
Contracts, per professor, by scientific discipline (ml Liras) (academic year 1994-95) 
Private Funding Research contracts 
Mathematics 0,1351 0,2642 
Physics 0,3353 1,1997 
Chemistry 1,0102 2,9871 
Geology and environmental sciences 1,0071 2,7963 
Biology and biomedical sciences 0,8331 1,13 
 Medicine 1,6627 3,258 
Agriculture 0,9126 4,729 
Civil engineering and architecture 0,6068 4,0373 
Industrial Engineering 2,6036 6,6761 
Information  Technologies 1,3014 4,196 
Arts and Literature  0,3547 0,2918 
History and Philosophy 0,1022 0,297 
Law, political and social sciences 0,0416 0,2888 
Economics and  statistics 0,9704 0,9213 
Source: CRUI 
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 TABLE 3 TOP 15 UNIVERSITIES IN TERMS OF RESEARCH CONTRACTS AND TOTAL FUNDING FOR 
RESEARCH  (% OF THE TOTAL) YEAR 1995 
    
   Contract 
research 
TOTAL 
FUNDING
 
Milano Politecnico  9,2 Padova 9,3  
Napoli I   8,7 Roma I 8,2  
Milano Statale  7,9 Bologna 6,4  
Torino   7,2 Genova 5,3  
Roma I   6,6 Milano 5,1  
Bologna   6,1 Napoli I 4,5  
Pavia   3,9 Firenze 4,3  
Catania   3,7 Torino 3,8  
Firenze   3,5 Catania 3,5  
Genova   3,3 MilanoPolitecnico 2,8  
Padova   3,3 Bari 2,7  
Torino Politecnico  3,1 Pavia 2,7  
Palermo   3 Torino Politecnico 2,6  
Perugia   2,9 Cagliari 2,5  
Cagliari   2,9 Palermo 2,5  
Source: CRUI 
 
 
Table 4 Top 10 Departments in terms of research contracts (% of the total). Academic 
year 1994-95 
 
Production materials engineering   Naples 1   2.2 
Electronics and information    Milan Polytechnic  2.1 
Sciences and technology of animal productions Catania   2.1 
Structural engineering    Milan Polytechnic  1.6 
Electronic and biophysical engineering  Genova   1.6 
Legal medicine     Pavia    1.5 
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Table 5:  Industrial and public funding of academic research: all departments 
 
Random-effects tobit regression                  
 
     
                   RESCON   40%      60% 
 
 
ITAPUB     .1226854      -.1200683*      -.1596***    
(.18883)    (.0688)      (.0522) 
INTERPUB   .7672087***      .518702***      .85462***    
(.2244)    (.0681)     (.0598) 
PROF  1.705398***        2.513701***    2.8126*** 
(.44809)    (.1226)       (.1042) 
ADTECH       .6567993***   .156881**     .17311***     
(.2438)     (.0745)        (.0649) 
STUD       -.0070056***   -.00126***      -.0014***    
(.0017)     (.0004)     (.0003) 
PAT                               -8.322178*** 5.491348***    -7.067*** 
(3.409)  (1.2542)    (1.083) 
PATres             97.59456***   -44.44164***      134.42***    
(43.7559)    (16.1426)    (14.2103) 
PATres2     .0874427***   -.0649485***      .0663***    
(.0409)     (.0150)     (.0129) 
MANEMP     .0013019   -.0003044      .0057***    
(.0015)     (.0005)     (.0004) 
MANEMPRES     .00004*    -8.09e-07      -.0010***    
(.0001)     (6.35e-06)         (5.88e-06) 
MANEMPRES2    -.128032   -.0122336      -.1126***    
(.0225)     (.0088)     (.0076) 
POPPROV    .00000702   -1.93e-06      .00004***    
(.00007)    (.00002)    (.00001)  
CONSTANT      -595.6655***   22.9397      30.31007    
(198.68)          (28.7422)    (25.6309) 
 
DUMMIES UNIVERSITIES YES    YES     YES 
 
Nr of observations:  
uncensored   1359    2166       2608 
left-censored     1202        671    387 
right-censored            0            0                     0 
Wald chi2(54) =    379.33    1347.36    3505.97 
Log likelihood  =  -9897.1929   -13023.872                      -15040.098 
Prob > chi2 =     0.0000     0.0000    0.0000 
 
 29
 
Table 6:  Industrial and public funding of academic research: biomedical and engineering departments 
 
Random-effects tobit regression                  
 
                    RESCON  40%      60% 
 
 
ITAPUB     -.0441418   -.0879162      -.0991645**    
   (.2358)   (.09008)    (.0499) 
INTERPUB  1.046139***    .2557905***      .3818962***    
   (.3661)      (.1145)    (.0774) 
PROF  3.416635***  3.511103***      3.624748***   
 (.9774)    (.2733)    (.1800) 
ADTECH       2.012322**   .3236912     -.06938    
 (.9390)    (.2583)    (.1680) 
STUD       .012434***   .0028727***      .0013365**    
   (.0033)                            (.0009)    (.0006) 
PAT                                   -5.98947                           3.831608**   -4.606944***    
     (5.2576)  (1.978)    (1.296) 
PATres     64.87395   -21.16333   102.1559***  
(67.77185)  (25.7344)   (17.2019)   
PATres2     .0519304   -.0388867   .04574***  
   (.0634)   (.023819)   (.0155) 
MANEMP     .0010622   -.0008265      .0041839***  
   (.0020)    (.00074)    (.0005) 
MANEMPRES      3.09e-06   .000021**      -.0000318***  
   (.00003)   (.00001)    (7.22e-06) 
MANEMPRES2    -.0041568   -.0008265   -.0951272***  
   (.0344)    (.0007)    (.0095) 
POPPROV    -.0000388   .0000869***   .0000816***   
     (.00007)   (.00003)    ( .00002) 
CONSTANT      -130.9066  -166.8282***    -25.08835 
     (184.245)  (57.339)    (40.3537) 
 
DUMMIES UNIVERSITIES YES  YES   YES 
 
Nr of observations:  
uncensored   827   950   1215 
left-censored    384   339     190 
right-censored          0         0                0 
Wald chi2(46) =    259.98   748.99   1914.48    
Log likelihood  =  -5939.6276  -5736.846   -6723.2869                     
Prob > chi2  =      0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
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Table 7:  Two step regressions. First step: International and Italian publications. 
 
Random effects probit regressions 
 
    All departments   Engineering and biomedical 
 
   INTERPUB  ITAPUB INTERPUB  ITAPUB 
IATAPUB-1      .0520143***       .0927395*** 
     (.0097802)    (.0226269) 
INTERPUB-1      .048073***       .0900025** 
    (.0115844)        (.0338729) 
PROF-1      .0196165*     -.0093172    -.0137709     -.0397754*    
(.0107068)     (.0073453) (.0336306)  (.0146009) 
ADTECH-1   .0733328***     .0238032     .0948199     .0388331*    
(.0235093)   (.014775)  (.0613792)  (.0222776) 
STUD    -.0000638     .0000439*    -.0000295     .0000495    
(.0000233)   (.0000228) (.0000784)  (.0000396) 
PAT                -.0611024     -.0953281**    -.0625075     -.0625075    
(.0310899)   (.0292342) (.0918476)  (.0918476) 
PATres           .3169842     .7583586**    -.7422853     -2.703586    
(.4903617)   (.2779931) (1.719834)  (2.379852) 
PATres2          .000888**     .0013075    .0011798     .000797    
(.0003911)   (.0003904) (.0012017)  (.0011585) 
MANEMP         .0000129     .0000277***    5.30e-07     -.0000218    
(9.41e-06)   (6.50e-06) (.0000305)  (.0000213) 
MANEMPRES  -2.18e-07**     -4.39e-07***    -3.81e-07     -2.72e-07    
(1.25e-07)   (1.11e-07) (4.32e-07)  (3.84e-07) 
MANEMPRES2         .000209        .0013022     .0026596    
(.000296)         (.0012476)  (.0017746) 
POPPROV  -9.10e-07**     -9.09e-07**    -3.27e-06     -4.82e-06   
(5.44e-07)   (2.94e-07) (2.32e-06)  (3.28e-06) 
Ph.D      .0067008***     -.002054    .0053375     .0021518    
(.0022761)   (.0018133)   (.0071765)  (.0036403) 
CONST      .7795642     1.974315***     4.333203*     4.657876*    
(.7186375)   (.516898) (2.605921)  (2.825498) 
 
Nr of observations:       771      1079  490   488 
Wald chi2(12)=      50.07     46.15  10.13   25.88 
Log likelihood =   -347.59335    -182.12053 -107.2557                     -90.895703 
Prob > chi2 =       0.0000      0.0000 0.6042   0.0112 
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Table 8:  Two step regressions. Second  step: Industrial funding. All departments 
 
Random-effects tobit regressions 
 
All departments   Engineering and biomedical 
 
 
   RESCON    RESCON 
 
PREDINTBUB    1041.151***    1479.698***    
   (118.6536)    (495.0128) 
PREDITAPUB    93.30122    281.5095    
( 208.6662)    (171.4219) 
PROF     -1.376468*       5.671015*** 
   (.7835169)    (1.57543) 
ADTECH    5.759218          1.938105 
   (1.208127)    (1.9436) 
STUD      .0096612***    .01673***   
   (.0027373     (.0045707) 
PAT   -9.838623***    -11.05003*   
   (3.440803)    (5.006576) 
 PATres      102.1889 **      166.4104** 
   (46.63674)      (67.04316) 
PATres2      .1171386***       .1140949*   
   (.0441413)    ( .0642589) 
MANEMP     .0037232***     .005128**    
   (.0013943)    (.0020096) 
MANEMPRES    -.0000502***       -.0000619***    
   (.0000166)    (.0000233) 
MANEMPRES2     -.0284397    -.0849876*    
   (.0318209)    (.0466049) 
POPPROV    -.0000567     -.0000208 
   ( .0000467)    (.0000657) 
CONS     -1082.582***     -1784.536***    
   ( 241.2517)    (523.7468) 
Observations:        
uncensored:   511     312 
left-censored:   411     125 
right-censored:   0     0 
Wald chi2(12) =     187.75     102.28 
Log likelihood  =   -3728.8616                       -2270.4756 
Prob > chi2 =      0.0000     0.0000 
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